In an era of open-access publishing, the risk of research being misused is growing – and the issue is increasingly resonating across academia worldwide. At the recent international seminar Academic & Security Counter Exploitation, experts discussed potential solutions and shared their experience. Chair of the MU Academic Senate Petr Najvar, who attended the seminar in the United States, spoke to Magazine M about knowledge security and protection and about the steps that Masaryk University is planning to take.
What does knowledge security actually involve?
It primarily concerns protecting knowledge and safeguarding information in academia and in public administration and preventing any undue influence by foreign powers or interest groups. The term “counter-influence” is often used in this context. Knowledge security falls under the broader concept of institutional and research resilience, which also includes academic ethics.
Can you give a concrete example from research universities?
We can divide it into three categories. The first is harmful transfer – the undesirable movement of technological or research information into the hands of individuals or organisations that may misuse it. In the past, this was known as industrial espionage.
The second category involves hostile influence operations, which aim to steer our decisions in ways that benefit our competitors rather than ourselves. This often works by disrupting established networks and creating distrust, ultimately weakening relationships.
The third category is academic integrity. Researchers should follow ethical standards and avoid shortcuts in pursuit of their goals.

Research relies on collaboration and open publishing is a means to that end. Where does the risk lie?
In the past, inventors patented their ideas to profit from further development. We have moved on from that model, recognising it is not the fastest way to advance technology. It makes much more sense to make our results openly accessible and let others build on them and drive innovation forward.
The Euro-Atlantic liberal world has gradually embraced the idea that cooperation is more valuable than dominance. However, some cultures think very differently. In today’s highly interconnected world, where new power structures are emerging, this can create a very dangerous situation.
Openly published research results could become part of strategic goals of countries like China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, correct?
These countries are often mentioned in discussions on knowledge security because they approach people and other countries differently. Numerous case studies show that we are being observed, analysed and our systems exploited.
For instance, Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated in recent years that technological progress and power competition are closely linked, that cutting-edge technology is the frontline and the battlefield and that China wants to be the world leader in research and innovation. This suggests a drive for dominance that China, as a totalitarian state, cannot achieve by following the same rules as liberal democracies – and that calls for caution.
Yet cooperation with China reaps economic benefits, at least that was the official argument in the Czech Republic…
In the short term? Yes, it can support economic growth. But in the long run, we cannot be sure of the outcome – whether we are talking about local partnerships with Chinese counterparts or broader memoranda of cooperation. The question is whether cutting-edge European technologies might soon help China in undesirable ways, for instance in carrying out genocide against the Uyghur population. And there is another issue: we may be helping China not only through direct cooperation, but also through open publishing. China is not primarily interested in shared scientific progress, but in strategic dominance.
You have mentioned open access to research information several times. Where is the main problem?
Universities place strong emphasis on international networking and publishing in international journals. The number of academic papers is crucial for career progression and meeting that requirement is not easy. Prestige is linked to English-language journals with international editorial boards. But if those journals are based in Russia or China, researchers should be cautious. This is not only about ethics, but also about knowledge security. Once published, studies are easily accessible – including to those who may use them, for example, in developing military applications.

You recently returned from an international seminar in Texas. How do your colleagues from other countries approach knowledge security?
The Academic & Security Counter Exploitation seminar took place at Texas A&M University. Although 500 participants from 29 countries attended this year’s tenth edition, we mainly looked at the issue through an American lens. One of the talks even theoretically considered cutting off international cooperation altogether. In the past, isolation combined with self-sufficiency and geographical distance worked for the United States. But that is not the right path – it would go against the basic idea that cooperation brings progress. Instead, much of the discussion focused on how to limit the risks of unwanted transfers and influence operations, and how to reduce the threat by being prepared.
And how can we do that?
Right now, the solutions tend to be bureaucratic. One example is counter-influence manuals. In the United States, they also work with blacklists and whitelists of Chinese partners since China is seen as the main direct threat. Russia, in their view, is currently occupied with other conflicts, North Korea is unpredictable but small, and Iran’s future development remains uncertain.
At the same time, we can reduce risks by raising awareness – not only among companies and entrepreneurs, but especially in academia. The key is to explain clearly what consequences our decisions in cooperation may have, and to help people understand what to watch out for.
Would some kind of guidelines help people decide?
We should introduce basic mechanisms for working in an international environment. For example, it sometimes happens that a university trains a doctoral student, equips them with the latest knowledge and then sends them to China for an internship. That is something we should carefully consider depending on the field. We cannot create one universal solution, though. What we need instead are measures tailored to specific situations.
Universities with a strong focus on technology are the main targets, but influence operations are also a serious threat. Why?
They aim to shape academics’ views and create a positive image of a country that poses a risk to knowledge security. And this is no longer limited to technical fields – it also affects humanities and social sciences.
It can involve building contacts at informal events, such as a simple film screening at an embassy, and collecting information that is not necessarily professional, but relates to workplace relationships. In strategic competition, any piece of information can be useful. It is important to realise that such data are collected, stored, and later used for purposes we may not even be able to foresee. That is why counter-influence manuals are being developed – documents that suggest how to act based on an assessment of risks.
This sounds quite alarming. Won’t it lead to distrust among people?
We need to learn to strike a balance between self-destructive suspicion and uncritical openness to the world.
What steps has Masaryk University taken to ensure knowledge security?
Masaryk University has introduced a directive that sets out rules for strengthening institutional resilience, particularly when it comes to undue influence from high-risk actors. It is now working on establishing a new advisory body to the rector.
Are there plans for training or lectures on this topic?
Although knowledge security is a serious issue, any measures we might want to take should be tested before implementation. That way, we can develop helpful mechanisms without adding more red tape.
Personally, I have good experience with workplace safety training. It is an online test that delivers key information but does so with humour and without being extremely serious. At the same time, I think raising awareness is essential. It is not just about people at the university understanding knowledge security – students and staff also need to see their teachers and supervisors behave in the right way. That should become part of the culture, which cannot be changed by simply publishing a directive on a website.
Knowledge security mainly concerns researchers and doctoral students. What approach should other students and staff take?
In the legacy of the first Czechoslovak president Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, we often hear about “education and morality”. Applied to this issue, it means being well-informed, so we understand the problem, but also acting ethically in our work. For example, not taking part in something we believe is wrong, even if it brings economic or other benefits.
